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Punishment is an effective way to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. In most of pre-
vious studies, objects of punishment are set to be defectors. In this paper, we propose a mechanism
of punishment, in which individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority
strategy in a public goods game group. Both theoretical analysis and simulation show that the co-
operation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority. For no punishment or small values
of punishment fine, the fraction of cooperators continuously increases with the multiplication factor.
However, for large values of punishment fine, there exists a critical value of multiplication factor,
at which the fraction of cooperators suddenly jumps from 0 to 1. The density of different types of
groups is also studied.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To understand the emergence of cooperative behavior among selfish individuals, researchers have considered various
mechanisms [1–3], such as network reciprocity [4–6], voluntary participation [7, 8], teaching activity [9–11], social
diversity [12], migration [13, 14], chaotic payoff variations [15], extortion [16–18], reputation [19], memory [20, 21],
diverse activity patterns [22], the coevolution setup [23], onymity [24] and so on.
So far, punishment has been proved to be an effective way to enforce cooperative behavior and various mechanisms
of punishment have been proposed [25–31]. Szolnoki et al found that the impact of pool punishment on the evolution of
cooperation in structured populations is significantly different from that reported previously for peer punishment [33].
Perc and Szolnoki proposed an adaptive punishment that can promote public cooperation through the invigoration of
spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to
those that sanction antisocial behavior [34]. Chen et al showed that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors
rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment [35]. Cui
and Wu demonstrated that the presence of selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can help individuals out of
both first-order and second-order social dilemma [36].
In previous studies, objects of punishment are individuals who hold a specific strategy (usually is deemed to be
defection). However, the punished strategy may not be fixed but depends on the surrounding environment, e.g., on
neighbors’ strategies. Psychological experiments have demonstrated that, an individual tends to follow the majority
in behavior or opinion. There exist some psychological or financial punishments of being minority [37, 38]. Based on
the above consideration, we propose a mechanism of punishment in which individuals with the majority strategy will
punish those with the minority strategy in a group. Utilizing the public goods game (PGG) as a prototypical model
of group interaction, we find that cooperation can be greatly promoted by punishing minority.
II. MODEL
Our model is described as follows.
Individuals are located on a 1000×1000 square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Every individual occupies
a lattice point and has four neighboring points. A PGG group is composed of a sponsor and its four neighbors. Thus
the size of each PGG group is 5. Each individual i participates in five different PGG groups organized by i and its
four neighbors respectively.
At each time step, every cooperator contributes a unit cost to each involved PGG group. Defectors invest nothing.
The total cost of a group is multiplied by a factor r, and is then redistributed uniformly to all the five players in
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2this group. In every PGG group, individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority strategy.
Each minority in the group is punished with a fine α. Following the previous study [35], we assume that punishers
equally share the associated costs. If cooperators are majority and defectors are minority in the group, then each
cooperator pays a cost α(5− nc)/nc, where nc is the number of cooperators in the group. Oppositely, if defectors are
majority and cooperators are minority in the group, then each defector pays a cost αnc/(5− nc).
We denote i’s strategy as si = 1 for cooperation and si = 0 for defection. The payoff that player i gains from the
group organized by player j is calculated by the following equations:
if nc = 0 or 5, Π
j
i = −si +
rnc
5
; (1)
if 2 < nc < 5 and si = 1, Π
j
i = −1 +
rnc
5
−
α(5 − nc)
nc
; (2)
if 2 < nc < 5 and si = 0, Π
j
i =
rnc
5
− α; (3)
if 0 < nc < 3 and si = 1, Π
j
i = −1 +
rnc
5
− α; (4)
if 0 < nc < 3 and si = 0, Π
j
i =
rnc
5
−
αnc
5− nc
. (5)
Equation (1) means that there is no punishment when the group is occupied by full cooperators or full defectors. For
equations (2) and (3), cooperators punish defectors in the group. While for equations (4) and (5), defectors punish
cooperators in the group. The total payoff of the player i is calculated by
Pi =
∑
jǫΩi
Πji , (6)
where Ωi denotes the community of neighbors of i and itself.
Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed with the equal probability 0.5. Individuals asyn-
chronously update their strategies in a random sequential order [39–41]. Firstly, an individual i is randomly selected
who obtains the payoff Pi according to the above equations. Next, individual i chooses one of its nearest neighbors at
random, and the chosen neighbor j also acquires its payoff Pj . Finally, individual i adopts the neighbor j’s strategy
with the probability [42]:
W (si ← sj) =
1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/K]
, (7)
where K characterizes the noise introduced to permit irrational choices. Following the previous studies [43, 44], we
set the noise level to be K = 0.5.
The key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behavior of the system is the fraction of cooperators ρc in the
steady state. In our simulation, ρc is obtained by averaging over the last 10
4 Monte Carlo steps (MCS) of the entire
106 MCS. Each MCS consists of on average one strategy-updating event for all individuals. Each data is obtained by
averaging over 20 different realizations.
III. RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the multiplication factor r for different values of the
punishment fine α. From Fig. 1, one can see that, for no punishment (α = 0) or a light punishment (e.g., α = 0.3),
ρc continuously increases from 0 to 1 as r increases. However, for a severe punishment (e.g., α = 0.8), there exists an
abrupt transition point (r ≈ 3.38 for α = 0.8), at which ρc suddenly jumps from 0 to 1. For a fixed value of r, the
payoff difference between the two neighboring nodes is limited when the punishment is light, thus individuals with the
minority strategy can survive in the system if their payoffs are larger than that of neighbors with the majority strategy.
However, for a severe punishment, the payoff difference between the two different strategies is large, individuals with
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the multiplication factor r for different values of the
punishment fine α. For small values of α (e.g., α = 0 or α = 0.3), the dependence of ρc on r displays a continuous phase
transition. However, for large values of α (e.g., α = 0.8), the phase transition becomes discontinuous.
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FIG. 2: Full punishment fine-multiplication factor (α − r) phase diagram. There are three regions: full cooperators (C), full
defectors (D), and the coexistence of cooperators and defectors (C +D). Solid line denotes continuous phase transition, while
dashed line marks discontinuous phase transition. The region of C +D disappears when α > 0.45.
the local majority strategy gain much more than those with the local minority strategy. In this case, the coexistence
of the two different strategies becomes extremely difficult. Once a strategy becomes dominated in the late stage of
evolution, it will determinately take over the whole system.
In Fig. 2, we plot the full α− r phase diagram, which can be divided into three regions: full cooperators (C), full
defectors (D), and the coexistence of cooperators and defectors (C+D). Different regions are separated by solid lines.
One can see that, the critical value of the multiplication factor r below which cooperators die out and the critical
value of the multiplication factor r above which defectors disappear decrease as the punishment fine α increases. At
the same time, the region of C + D becomes narrower as the punishment fine α increases. Particulary, the region
of C + D disappears when α > 0.45, indicating that cooperators and defectors cannot coexist in the case of severe
punishment.
Next, we study how the punishment fine affects the cooperation level. From Fig. 3, one can observe that for a fixed
value of the multiplication factor r, the fraction of cooperators ρc increases with the punishment fine α, manifesting
that more severe punishment can better promote cooperation.
It has been known that the coevolution of cooperator clusters and defector clusters plays an important role in
spatial games [45, 46]. In Fig. 4, we plot a typical interface that separate clusters of the two competing strategies.
According to the analysis in Ref. [35], the leading invasions thereby are those which are marked with arrows. The
likelihood of other elementary processes is much smaller, and hence their contribution to the evolution of clusters is
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the punishment fine α for different values of the
multiplication factor r. For each value of r, ρc increases with α, indicating that severe punishment is in favor of cooperation.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Schematic presentation of the interface that separates cooperators (blue) and defectors (red). The two
leading elementary processes that contribute the most to the change of the interface are marked by arrows. The average payoff
difference between the two strategies is PC − PD = 3r/2 + 17α/24 − 5, which increases as the punishment fine α increases.
negligible. According to Fig. 4, the average payoff difference between the two strategies can be calculated as
PC − PD =
3r
2
+
17α
24
− 5. (8)
From Eq. (8), one can find that the value of PC − PD increases as α increases, implying that the cooperator clusters
can more effectively invade the defector clusters when punishment is more severe.
To confirm the above analysis, we plot spatial strategy distributions at different time steps. For α = 0, one can
observe that cooperators gradually die out, as shown in Figs. 5(a)-(d). For α = 0.4, initially the density cooperators
decreases [see Fig. 5(e) and Fig. 5(f)]. With time the cooperator clusters continue to expand [see Fig. 5(g)] and
finally occupy the whole system [see Fig. 5(h)]. To more intuitively understand how the punishment fine affects the
evolution of clusters, we set initially a giant cooperator (defector) cluster in the left (right) half of square lattices.
The multiplication factor is set to be r = 3.5. From Figs. 16(a)-(d), one can see that for the small value of α (e.g.,
α = 0.2), the defector cluster gradually invades the cooperator cluster and the original one big cooperator cluster is
divided into some small clusters. For the large value of α (e.g., α = 0.8), the cooperator cluster continually expands
while the defector cluster gradually shrinks [see Fig. 5(e)-(h)]. Note that for α = 0.2, the interfaces separating domains
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Snapshots of typical distributions of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) at different time steps. To
facilitate observe, we use a smaller system size, that is, 200× 200 lattices. The multiplication factor r = 3.7. The punishment
fine α for (a)-(d) and (e)-(f) is 0 and 0.4 respectively. For α = 0, cooperators gradually die out. For α = 0.4, initially the
number of cooperators greatly reduces and the survival cooperators form some small clusters. With time the cooperator clusters
continue to expand and finally occupy the whole system.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Density of the four types of groups as a function of time step t when the multiplication factor r = 3.7.
The punishment fine α for (a) and (b) is 0 and 0.4 respectively. Gcc (Gdd) denotes the PGG group which is occupied by full
cooperators (defectors), and Gcd (Gdc) denotes the PGG group in which cooperators (defectors) punish defectors (cooperators).
of cooperators and defectors become littery. However, for α = 0.8, the boundary between the two competing clusters
remains smooth during the whole evolution. As pointed out in Ref. [34] , noisy borders are beneficial for defectors,
while straight domain walls help cooperators to spread. From Figs. 4-5, we can understand why cooperation can be
enhanced by enforcing more severe punishment.
We divide PGG groups into four types: Gcc (Gdd) denotes the group which is fully occupied by cooperators
(defectors), and Gcd (Gdc) denotes the group in which cooperators (defectors) punish defectors (cooperators). Figure 6
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Stationary density of the four types of groups as a function of the punishment fine α when the
multiplication factor r = 3.7. The stationary density of Gcc (Gdd) groups increases (decreases) as α increases. The stationary
density of Gcd and Gdc groups are maximized at moderate values of α. Note that for α < 0.25, the density of Gcd groups is
lower than that of Gdc groups. Conversely, the density of Gcd groups is higher than that of Gdc groups when α > 0.25.
shows the density of the four types of groups as a function of the time step t when the multiplication factor r = 3.7.
From Fig. 6(a), one can see that the density of Gcc decreases to 0 as time evolves when the punishment fine α = 0.
However, for α = 0.4 [see Fig. 6(b)], the density of Gcc firstly decreases and then increases to 1 as time evolves. With
time the density of Gdd groups increases to 1 for α = 0. However, for α = 0.4, the density of Gdd groups firstly
increases to be close to 1, and then decreases to 0. For both of α = 0 and α = 0.4, the density of Gcd gradually
decreases to 0 as time t increases. The density of Gdc firstly increases and then decreases to 0 as time evolves.
During the early evolution (i. e., t < 100), the density of Gcd groups is lower than that of Gdc groups, indicating
that cooperators are more likely to be punished. We need to point out that, although the larger value of α is more
disadvantageous for cooperators in the initial stage, it can help the surviving cooperator clusters more effectively
expand and finally take over the whole system.
Figure 7 shows the stationary density of the four types of groups as a function of the punishment fine α when the
multiplication factor r = 3.7. One can see that the density of Gcc groups increases with α while the stationary density
of Gdd groups decreases as α increases. The stationary density of Gcd or Gdc groups peaks at the moderate value of
α. It is interesting to note that, for small values of α (α < 0.25), the stationary density of Gcd groups is lower than
that of Gdc groups. On the contrary, for larger values of α (α > 0.25), the stationary density of Gcd groups is higher
than that of Gdc groups, indicating that defectors become more likely to be punished.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
To summarize, we have proposed a new mechanism of punishment in which individuals with the majority strategy
will punish those with the minority strategy in a public goods game group. Note that in our mechanism, an individual
can play a dual role. He/She can be a punisher in one group but meanwhile be punished in another group. We find that
the cooperation level increases with the punishment fine. Compared to a light punishment, a severe punishment widens
the payoff gap between cooperators and defectors along the interface that separates the two competing strategies,
thus promotes the expansion of cooperator clusters.
The interplay between opinion dynamics and evolutionary games has received increasing attention. Szolnoki and
Perc have found that, suitably follow the majority strategy among neighbors can enhance the cooperation level [47, 48].
In our work, we propose the punishment rule in which individuals with the majority strategy are able to punish
those with minority strategy. Thus, cooperators and defectors could be punished by each other, depending on the
compositions in the groups. And then the pro-social and anti-social punishments are both possible in our study. It
is thus not intuitive to predict whether cooperation can be promoted in the punishment rule, especially when the
complex structured interactions are considered. Interestingly, we find that using the strategy of punishing minority
can increase the final cooperation level. In particular, when the punishment fine is high, cooperators can suddenly
thrive and thus dominate the population from the outcome of full defection. Together [47, 48] and our work can
7provide a deeper understanding of the impact of opinion dynamics on the evolution of cooperation.
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